

SicuroInformation

Sudan

# Sudan Report



**Sudan Update - 26.06.2011**

## Summary

The tense security situation along the proposed border between North and South Sudan is likely to deteriorate in the run up to July 9th: the official date for southern secession. Notable contested areas and potential 'hot spots' of violence include the Abyei Region, South Kordofan, and the Blue/White Nile regions. Armed clashes in these areas have led to major population displacement, and rendered future prospects for cooperation between north and south unclear. Several contentious post-referendum arrangements have also yet to be agreed upon: including final border demarcation, land rights, citizenship, splitting national debt, and oil sharing. The latter is proving to be an extremely contentious issue, as both sides are dependent on oil proceeds to fund their budgets.

## Military Situation



### Abyei

- Determined to show itself as the more powerful partner in the secession process, Khartoum sent tanks and troops into the disputed Abyei region last month; a move internationally denounced as a violation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between north and south.
- Abyei is therefore on the brink of dangerous new conflict that risks escalation of violent confrontation between security forces and other armed proxies from North and South Sudan on the eve of Southern independence.
- The use of MiG and Antonov aircraft by SAF forces to bombard contested regions such as Abyei is now commonplace. Whether or not the bombing will continue after 9th July is becoming an ever more pressing issue.
- Satellite imagery has corroborated ground reports of looting and the intentional destruction of Abyei town by uniformed SAF forces and armed, northern-aligned militias.
- The US has submitted a draft resolution to the U.N. Security Council that would authorize the deployment of 4,200 Ethiopian troops in Abyei. Both sides seemed to agree to this proposal, calling for the establishment of an interim UN security force, and the withdrawal of all other armed forces from the area.

### South Kordofan

- Satellite Imagery has shown SAF forces amassing in Kadugli, in what could signal an imminent major northern offensive against forces aligned with southern SPLA forces in South Kordofan.
- Since fighting around Kadugli and the Nuba Mountains began in early June, the northern SAF forces have been targeting civilian infrastructure, looting, conducting extra judicial killings, house searches, and attacks based on ethnicity or political affiliations. There are concerns that the ethnic cleansing seen in Darfur could be replicated in the contested border regions between north and south.
- Much of South Kordofan's Nuba population aligned with the SPLA during the civil war, and therefore is viewed as a threat by the government in Khartoum, which said it would not tolerate an armed group within its boundaries, and demanded the Nuba fighters disarm or leave. South Sudan is unlikely to risk losing its shot at peaceful separation to protect the Nuba population: and has argued against assimilating them in southern territory because they are northerners and not part of its army.
- Calls to establish a Libya-style no fly zone over South Kordofan are unlikely to be heeded by the international community.

### Other Regions

- The UN Security Council today called upon all parties to the long-running conflict in the Darfur region of western Sudan to reach an agreement based on the Doha Document for Peace presented to the Council yesterday.
- The tensions of the lead-up to secession are likely to override any sentiments of reconciliation in Darfur, as the SAF have redeployed troops in areas close to the border. Violent clashes have also broken out this week between government and rebel forces in the area of Fina, east of Jebel Marra.

### Political / Humanitarian Situation



- Under president Bashir, the ruling NCP party has failed to address the root causes of the various conflicts which have ravaged Sudan. The party is deeply divided over the best way forward after the

secession of the south. Bashir's reliance on personal loyalty and tribal allegiance have reinforced his divide and rule policy to prevent the emergence of a unified political counterweight to the NCP. In the absence of mechanisms of accountability, Bashir has made full use of institutionalized corruption to reinforce his patronage network. The failings of the NCP therefore appear to be setting the stage for continued violence in Sudan.

- The secession of South Sudan is proving to be a political conundrum. Important strategic regions such as Blue Nile and South Kordofan are in a process of 'popular consultation', where key issues are debated in a series of hearings, and votes are held to determine levels of regional autonomy and self-determination.
- Abyei was also supposed to hold a referendum
- Agreement between north and south establishes no real timeframe for political settlement between different ethnic and religious groups. The political dimension of secession is therefore limited in scope and lacking components for its successful implementation.
- The culturally distinct Nuba people of South Kordofan embody these political tensions. Having sided with southern SPLM rebel forces during the civil war, the Khartoum government has always viewed the Nuba people as a political and military threat. The north-south peace agreement therefore has been implemented in a way which has failed to address the Nuba's concerns, and ultimately will contribute to their political isolation between north and south.
- Unless these diverse grievances are addressed by a more inclusive government, Sudan risks more violence and disintegration.
- The widespread displacement of civilians in all regions could well lead to a disruption in agricultural output and food shortages across Sudan.

## Economic Situation



- A chief obstacle to a peaceful transition is how best to share oil revenues from Sudan, sub-Saharan Africa's third-biggest producer after Nigeria and Angola. While the south holds around 75% of Sudan's oil reserves, the north has the refineries, pipelines, and international port. The south needs Khartoum's co-operation to sell its oil; the north needs revenues from its neighbor's resources.
- President al Bashir has threatened to shut down the pipelines that transfer oil from the landlocked South to Port Sudan unless the 50-50 revenue sharing deal of 2005 is maintained, or a fee to be im-

- posed on every barrel of oil is agreed upon.
- China, Sudan's biggest trade partner, has invited Bashir to Beijing next week to discuss ways to end the fighting in the border regions.
  - The longer the fighting persists around oil producing regions such as Abyei and South Kordofan, the more likely it is that production will be affected.
  - Last week the minister of finance and national economy Ali Mahmood Hassanein said that the North will lose 36.5% of its income after the South secedes. He said there are contingency plans in place that aim to cushion the fallout.
  - Currently the economy in the North is marred by soaring inflation rates and chronic shortage in hard currency. Furthermore, Sudan has a crippling \$38 billion in external debt.
  - The IMF said that the North "will need to adjust to a permanent shock" particularly given the limited access to external financing. Sudan has been under comprehensive economic sanctions since 1997.
  - German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle visited Khartoum this week, urging both sides to proceed peacefully with secession. He also sought to open up discussions over allocations of German foreign aid to Sudan, as well as securing favorable investment opportunities in Sudan for German companies.
  - The Governor of Upper Nile State, Simon Kun Puoc, has said the government is committed to structural and institutional reforms to ensure a balanced mix of investment across the agricultural, manufacturing, transport and oil sectors, to ensure a dynamic and diversified economy.

