Observers remained in their polling stations throughout the day and reported through their respective county and state coordinators to data collection and analysis centers for SuNDE in Juba and SuGDE in Khartoum, where the reports were verified for quality and analyzed impartially according to standards for non-partisan election observation. SuGDE and SuNDE shared their observations and findings and developed this fact-based statement, released simultaneously at press conferences in Khartoum and Juba, respectively.

Below are the report’s executive summary and a selection from the 15 graphs included in the Statement. the report is divided into two parts, one by the SUGDE of activities in the north and the other by SuNDE of activities in the south. This report and others are available in our reference library.

(Source: Election Statement by The Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE) and the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE) by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs - April 24, 2010)

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

• The April 2010 elections were a requirement for moving forward with implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). However, the elections did not fulfill the Interim Constitution’s and CPA’s aspirations for democratic transition and did not adequately meet the requirements of the National Elections Commission rules and regulations. Sudanese citizens demonstrated their desire for democracy without a doubt through their registering, voting and participating in lively political debate in these elections. Extraordinary efforts are required to achieve democratic governance, and SuNDE and SuGDE will seek to contribute constructively to securing peace and democratic progress. The hopes of citizens should not be allowed to slip away.
• SuNDE and SuGDE observed that the National Elections Commission (NEC) failed to adequately plan and prepare for the elections. The polling stations observed often lacked essential election materials to open on time or ran out of essential materials during the polling process. The inefficiency of the NEC to develop or publicize the polling station list and final voters’ lists in a timely manner also caused substantial confusion and potentially the disenfranchisement of a significant number of voters.

(Source: Election Statement by The Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE) and the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE) by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs - April 24, 2010)

• SuGDE and SuNDE observed that while the administration of the elections was deficient throughout Sudan, in Southern Sudan the administration of the elections was observed to be more problematic.
• SuGDE and SuNDE observed several positive aspects to the elections. Voters turned out in large numbers and conducted themselves in a largely peaceful manner. Polling officials showed a strong commitment to fulfilling their responsibilities, particularly given the difficult circumstances. Thousands of citizens volunteered with civic organizations to observe the election and stayed through all 7 days of the polling and the counting process.
• SuNDE and SuGDE recognize that this was the first election in Sudan since the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and understand that the complexity of the electoral process and difficult logistical environment of Sudan made running this election challenging.

(Source: Election Statement by The Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE) and the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE) by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs - April 24, 2010)

• However, SuGDE and SuNDE recorded significant flaws in the election process at the polling stations observed
• SuNDE recognized that in South Sudan the political parties actively participated in the election however, SuNDE observers noted a need for parties, candidates, and their supporters or agents to better understand their roles in the electoral process, particularly regarding interfering with the polling process
• SuGDE notes that in the North of Sudan leading political parties boycotted the elections which deprived citizens of choice and made the elections confusing and less competitive.
• SuNDE was concerned by the troubling number of incidents of intimidation and harassment reported by its observers in South Sudan, particularly by party and candidate agents and supporters, and unknown and unauthorized security personnel.

(Source: Election Statement by The Sudanese Group for Democracy and Elections (SuGDE) and the Sudanese Network for Democratic Elections (SuNDE) by National Democratic Institute for International Affairs - April 24, 2010)

• SuGDE was concerned by incidents of violence, intimidation and harassment in Southern Kordofan, Western Darfur, Northern Darfur and Sinnar
• SuGDE and SuNDE are deeply concerned that the electoral process did not meet citizen’s expectations and failed to fully embrace democratic principles at the polling stations observed
• SuNDE and SuGDE urge all election stakeholders to learn from these elections and apply those lessons to improve the transparency and credibility of future elections, including the 2011 Referendum.

A Sudanese policeman guards election boxes and kits inside a warehouse in Khartoum March 17, 2010. Sudan will hold its first multi-party elections in 24 years in April. (REUTERS/Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah)

Opposition party Umma Reform and Renewal Party (URRP) accused the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) of granting contracts for the printing of the election ballots to printers inside Sudan. UNMIS denied the accusations, saying that they regret the news reports that their Chief Electoral Affairs Officer was involved. According to China Radio International (CRI) English news service, “UNMIS spokesperson categorically dismisses such an allegation as unfounded.”

In a later Reuters report published on AlertNet, opposition parties are demanding an investigation into the Sudanese printing company who holds a contract to print the ballots for executive offices that include presidential and gubernatorial positions. Apparently, the UNDP had planned to give the contract to a Slovenian printer but the NEC intervened and gave it to the Sudanese Currency Printing Corporation, the government printer that also prints Sudan’s currency. It is unclear why the UNDP did not report the irregularity.

Other ballot papers were awarded by the UNDP to South African and British printing companies. Fears of potential fraud are mounting as the Sudanese Currency Printing Corporation could conceivably print illegal ballot papers to manipulate election results by stuffing ballot boxes.  This opens the door to the dispute of election results after the voting period and increase instability in an already volatile setting.

(source: Elections Assistance Bulletin UNDP Feb 2010)

Census and Voter Registration

A Juba resident makes her registration for the Natonal Elections in April 2010, by Bonifacio Taban.

There are prerequisites to conducting a democratic election that include a census of the population to determine who can vote and in which electoral constituency. The Sudan census has been contested by the SPLM and analysed by others.

Citizens are required to add themselves to the voter list during the voter registration process, followed by a verification of the voter list after its publication. The Carter Center provided observers to provide an impartial assessment of the process. Registration of political party lists with their representatives ended yesterday after a seven-day extension. 

Political Campaigning

Once the politicians place themselves inside the arena of an election, democratic principles require than they are able to voice their positions in an election campaign. This is when they can criticize current government practices and provide an alternative approaches to governence that will make the electorate choose them on a ballot. In Sudan, elections campaigning begins on February 13 and ends on April 9, two days before voting begins.

The Sudan Electionnaire is an English/Arabic quiz that will compare you view on 30 debated issues with the positions of the 16 main parties for the upcoming elections. Once the set of questions are completed a ranking shows how your answers match party programmes. A very interesting tool that was released by The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Sudan, the University of Khartoum Institute of Peace Research with funding from the UK Department for International Development.

Media Coverage

Thousands of wind-up and solar-powered blue radios distributed by NDI in Sudan are bringing a dialogue about national issues to isolated communities. (courtesy: National Democratic Institute)

Even before campaigning starts, the media’s role in election coverage is crucial. Radio, television, print, online media and ‘under-the-village-tree’ journalists act as messengers between the voters and those seeking votes. Journalists provide analysis and perspective to the public debate and hold politicians accountable to their proposed platforms and promises as the campaign progresses. They also provide an amplified mouthpeice to citizens wishing to express their opinions to the politicians and other citizens. Sudan Votes, another website affiliated with Sudan Electionnaire, has election reporting resources including a media code of conduct, a Reuters Reporter’s Guide to Election Coverage (.pdf), election broadcast guidelines, and media election process reference material.

Voter Education

Sudan has not held elections in 24 years and a civil war raged in the country for most of those years, so the election process is not well known by the Sudanese. With literacy rates among the lowest in the world (see chart below), particualrly in poorly developed Southern Sudan and Darfur, voter education is a significant challenge if the April elections are to be fair and democratic. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) prepared a Sudan Civic and Voter Education Baseline Study (.pdf) in 2008 with funding from the Canadian International Development Agency.

Electoral System

Typical elections might require the selection of one, two or three representatives. (view a clip, below, of the first presidential election in Afghanistan,  in 2004) In Southern Sudan, each electorate will have twelve (12) representatives to choose from for three levels of government.

Three votes will be cast to select 1) the President of the Republic of Sudan, 2) the President of the Government of Southern Sudan, and 3) the respective State Governor.

North versus South Sudan Statistics (courtesy: Oxfam, UN)

Southern Sudanese will have three votes to cast for each of the following three legislatures: 1) the National Assembly in Khartoum, 2) the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly in Juba, and 3) the State Legislative Assembly in their respective State. Each of the three legislature votes is divided into three components: 1) 60% of the members are elected to represent geographical constituencies at their respective levels, 2) 25% of the seats are to be filled by women members elected by proportional representation from party lists at state level, and 3) 15% of the members are elected by proportional representation also from party lists at the state level.

Considering the above literacy and education rates in Southern Sudan, it will take considerable effort to educate the average electorate about the details of such a complex ballot system.

Ballot Papers

Drafting ballot papers that will allow illiterate citizens to make their selection is a design challenge of mammoth proportions. There are at least sixteen political parties vying for votes in Sudan. Many of the parties are represented on the twelve seperate ballots in the South. Each ballot will have to distinguish each representative from the other, and a ballot will need to quickly depict which seat in which legislative assembly are the representatives seeking election. They elaborate electoral system will all have to be represented visually and comprehensively in a complex election that can confuse experienced literate voters.

Polling Stations

The logistical demands of establishing up to 30,000 polling stations, printing approximately 220 million ballot papers representing the various constituencies, then distributing them—with the ballot boxes and other material—to each of the polling locations is daunting in itself. It is particularly challenging in a country the size of Sudan where lack of basic infrastructure, community remoteness and insecurity can interfere with the most coordinated of efforts.

Sudan’s April 2010 elections may be the most complex elections ever organized. Anywhere. Considering that a self-determination referendum is expected in 2011, one wonders if it would have been more realistic and appropriate to hold a simpler election process. Perhaps it would have been sufficient to elect only the three executive seats: President of the Republic of Sudan, President of the Government of Southern Sudan and Governor of each state. The simplification could have left constituent representative elections for a post-referendum Sudan, which most observers agree will result in a yes vote for independence of the South from the rest of Sudan.

—

Watch a video clip by Dominique Morissette of Afghanistan’s first presidential elections held on November 9, 2004. The video is best viewed in full-screen mode.

Sudanese children in Juba promote voter registration by handing out posters (Peter Martel, IRIN)

Although the registration in the south began slowly, according to UNDP staff working with the National Election Commission (NEC), it quickly gained momentum in Southern Sudan. The SPLM-controlled region ended voter registration with a higher than average registration rate of around 86%. Today is the last day of the exhibition and objection process whereby a review of the registry is possible. The registration’s final result will be released by the NEC tomorrow.

This high rate of registration in the south may be due to a political pro-registration campaign from the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) which claims that data from the 2008 census underestimates the number of Southerners. The difference may also reflect a high number of people that returned to South since the census. What is interesting is the high turnout in northern states of Southern Sudan.

Mawien Kuc, National Election Commission Chairperson for Northern Bahr el Ghazal (a Southern Sudan state that borders northern Sudan) told the Sudan Tribune , “We will have over one million people registered and ready to take part in the next national election scheduled to take place in April 2010.” Mawien Kuc said, “I am telling you that we really committed our resources for proper mobilization of our people during registration.”

Sudan finances the majority of the registration process while 43% comes from donors.

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SOUTHERN SUDAN ELECTION PREPARATIONS (UNMIS)

National Elections Commission voter registry poster

[Montréal, Québec, Canada -6°C] today is the beginning of the seven-day display of Sudan’s Voter’s Registry. It is a time for people to confirm that their names are on the registry. Not much information about registration results is available nor of the numbers of people who have registered nor percentages of registrants versus eligible voters. This is a time when confusion may emerge while unregistered people check the list and realize that they are not on it and not be able to vote in next year’s April elections.

Al Jazeera’s Inside Story asks if Sudan’s elections can take place on time without a reform to the electoral laws. In this episode, aired yesterday, (Tuesday Dec. 8, 2009) included a discussion with:

• Abdelwahab El-Affendi Senior Research Fellow at the University of Westminster Centre for the Study of Democracy who was in London England;
• Rabie Abdul Atti, Advisor to Sudan’s Ministry of Information who was in Khartoum, Sudan; and
• Ali Al Haj Mohamed, the Deputy Secretary General of Sudan’s Popular Congress Party who was in Bonn, Germany.

A state of mistrust between the partners for peace currently ruling Sudan has put the old North/South rivals back on a collison course. Three senior leaders of the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) were briefly held on Monday in a police crackdown against opposition protests which demanded changes to the country’s electoral law.

Salva Kiir, the president of South Sudan, condemned the arrests, saying they broke the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005 that ended a devastating 22-year civil war between North and South. Police had announced that the electoral reform demonstrations would be considered illegal. However, several hundred opposition protesters marched through the streets of Khartoum and Omdurman, waving placards and chanting: “We want our freedom.”

The SPLM and the ruling NCP of Omar al-Bashir, the president of Sudan, have failed to agree on democratic reforms ahead of elections next April.

The SPLM’s Arman, left, and Amum, right, after their release in Khartoum [AFP].

Al Jazeera reports that confirm that Pagan Amum, SPLM’s Secretary General, Yassir Arman, Deputy Secretary General of SPLM in the north, and Abbas Gummas, state minister in the coalition government, were arrested during the rally and later released.

In reaction the the arrests, protesters in the Southern towns of Wau and Rumbek set fire to the NCP offices in those towns. A statement issued by the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS), Ashraf Jehangir Qazi, emphasized the “central importance of political rights and freedoms, especially in the lead-up to elections and referendum.”

Voter registration is now closed and results will eventually be made public to uncertain reaction.

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Further Reading:

- Sudan Arrests SPLM SG Pagan Amum and Yasir Arman (Sudan Tribune)

- Sudanese Government Cracks Down on Opposition (Enough Project)

- UN Envoy Calls On Parties to Abide by Peace Pact in Wake of Political Violence (UN News Service)

- Sudanese Regime Crackdown Requires International Crackdown on Sudanese Regime (The Huffington Post)

The material presented in the report comes from workshops in Malakal, Juba, Bor and Khartoum in May and June 2009, just after my own visit to Southern Sudan, although I went to Juba, Wau, Aweil and Abyei. Information comes from input during the workshops by local and international NGOs, faith group, politicians, government officials, civil society organizations and “others”.

The report defines four scenarios based on two uncertainties: 1) whether the country will be at war or at peace, and 2) whether the country will remain united or whether the south will secede from the north (see diagram below).

FOUR (five) SCENARIOS:

In the document’s executive summary, five main findings arose from the exercise of creating these four scenarios:

1. “It may not be wise to direct all long-term attention to developmental rather than humanitarian assistance.” because, the report stipulates, even in the best scenario (self-professed as the ‘CPA Hurray!’ scenario) “small-scale conflicts are still likely.”;
2. The ‘CPA Hurray!’ scenario is worth pursuing as a strategy because it “promises a less violent future.” But, according to this report (and this recent report), it “appears less plausible”.
3. The materialization of “free and fair elections is essential, not only to guarantee peace, but as the only peaceful way to bring about unity,” which according to September 2007 focus group survey, A Place to Call Their Own, as well as the report’s own southern focus groups, most Southerners do not want.
4. “Continuous outside mediation and pressure is needed to get all parties to implement the CPA and to make unity attractive.” It continues to explain that the “time horizon” needs more flexibility and needs to be extended beyond 2012. The need to talk about a “post-2012 period” is paramount particularly “about what unity might look like” to make the pre-2012 period “more manageable.”
5. “The critical difference between a successful and unsuccessful outcome will be to a large extent determined by whether the South has a stable, cooperative and confident leadership.”

The interesting future histories in Sudan between 2009-2012, created by the report’s author, lead to each of the four post-2012 Sudan scenarios are followed by the suggestions and policy options for the international community. They are well researched and seem to portray the current situation in Southern Sudan. Future histories are then formulated to create each of the four scenarios.

Based on the five main findings outlined above, the report seems to favour scenario #3, which represents the point of view of Northern focus groups, who view ‘CPA Hurray!’ as “a romantic but possible scenario.” The members of Southern focus groups expressed a belief that “a renewed war between the North and the South next to unavoidable” so scenarios one and two were most likely to them.

Possibly the most interesting element in the report is the identification by the Northern focus groups of a fifth “Stagnation’ scenario within the ‘no war’ and ‘united’ quadrant of the diagram. Based on a third uncertainty, which is given little attention these days, is the possibility that neither the 2010 elections nor the 2011 referendum will take place. They believe that “because elites in power in Khartoum and Juba have little to gain from [a election and a referendum], and prefer the present situation to continue.” This status quo situation would allow Sudanese and international actors to “muddle through, continuing to ‘band aid’ the Sudanese system together.”

According to a recent Inter Press Service (IPS) article, SOUTH SUDAN: Complicating the Vote for Women, by Ruth Omukhango writes:

Before Sudan went to war in 1983, women were not allowed to vie for political office or to vote. Next April, they will be asked to cast their ballots in a contest in which 25 per cent of seats have been reserved for women.

The article sites literacy issues, where most women can neither read nor write; the need for intensive civic eduction to allow women to properly participate in elections, and; the confusion about the conditions of nomination and representation and the cost of submitting a candidate as major obstacles.

The first issue of South Sudan Women’s Agenda, published in August 2009, focuses on the elections challenges facing women in South Sudan. One entry in the  magazine, produces by African Woman and Child Features Service (AWC) in partnership with United Nations Development Fund for Women in Sudan UNIFEM Sudan is the following manifesto.

Additional readings include:

- South Sudan Women Threaten to not Vote for Male Contenders (Sudan Tribune; 10 January 2009);

- Good Governance and Equity in Political Participation in Southern Sudan (UNDP, Sudan);

- Women in Southern Sudan declare readiness in upcoming national elections (The New Sudan Vision)

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THE JUBA DECLARATION BY SOUTHERN SUDAN WOMEN IN POLITICAL PARTIES

On The Women’s Common Agenda For The 2010 Elections

We, the women from the political parties in Southern Sudan, participating in the Conference for Southern Sudan Women in Political Parties to Develop a Women’s Common Agenda for the Elections, which took place in Juba from July 17 to 19,
2009, comprising representatives of the Government, Political Parties and Parliamentarians:
Strongly believe in women working together across party lines;
Affirm that unity of purpose is the foundation of equity and equality;
Also affirm that the women of Southern Sudan are renowned for their active participation in the pursuit of peace and good governance;
Further affirm that gender issues cannot be divorced from the political, social,
cultural, developmental, economic and security considerations in Southern Sudan.
Note that women in Southern Sudan have limited access to political party
leadership and decision-making, the media, education, economic empowerment, law, security, health, which has compromised women’s effective participation in national leadership,
Concerned about the rights and dignity of women, insecurity and the rule of law
in Southern Sudan and the environment in which the General Election will be held
State that it is in this context that women now seek greater representation and
participation in party politics and national leadership,
Affirm our support for all the outcomes of this conference with a view to
strengthening democracy through women’s greater participation at all levels of leadership as stated in the 25 percent principle,
Appreciate the role played by the Government of Southern Sudan and the
international community in supporting efforts to boost the role of women in politics and transformational leadership and drawing attention to the need to involve women in all stages of the election process and in the implementation of the National Elections Act 2008,

NOW WISH to call upon the National Electoral Commission, Political Parties Affairs Council, Political Parties in Southern Sudan and the media to address the following recommendations:

1. EFFECTIVE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN POLITICAL PARTIES

1. Raise women’s image and visibility within their parties by:
1.1 Increasing the number of women in political parties through intensive
women recruitment campaigns;
1.2 Developing their political knowledge and leadership skills;
1.3 Provision of financial support to women’s leagues and groups

2. Build the capacity of all party membership to understand and appreciate
gender issues;
3. Prepare and conduct democratic and transparent candidate selection
processes through:
3.1 include women in the selection teams and allow the women leagues to
monitor the candidate selection processes;
3.2 widely disseminate candidate selection rules;
3.3 instituting a mechanism whereby at least 10% of the candidates on the
party list are women and nomination of candidates for geographical
constituency seats;
3.4 commit and promote fair competition during internal elections;
3.5 establish an independent monitoring system for internal elections;
4. Party should support to women candidates through:
4.1 Provision of material and financial support;
1.2 Visibly support women candidates
1.3 Set up a women election basket

2.0 DEVELOPMENT OF GENDER-SENSITIVE MANIFESTOS

Political parties should ensure that the following gender specific issues are
addressed in their manifestos:
1. Zero-tolerance for corruption
2. Universal primary health care with emphasis on reproductive health
3. Continuous HIV/AIDS awareness campaigns coupled with accessible VCT
(Voluntary Counseling and Testing) Centers for the youth and married couples throughout Southern Sudan
4. Mass adult literacy campaign up to the community level
5. Free education for girls and construct at least one girls’ only secondary
boarding school in each state in Southern Sudan;
6. Clean and safe water at community level;
7. Micro enterprises and a micro enterprise fund for economic empowerment of
women at the grassroots / community level;
8. A policy to address gender based violence by:
8.1 Institutionalize special protection units at the police stations;
8.2 Support and medical care to survivors;
8.3 Rehabilitation and/or stiff penalty to perpetrators
9. Establish equal opportunities body to monitor:
9.1 Implementation of the Bill of rights in the Interim Constitution of
Southern Sudan;
9.2 Ratification of the international conventions that protect the rights of
women;
9.3 Implementation of gender and related policies
9.4 Implementation of the land policy
10. Establish schools for children with disabilities at county level
11. Establish mental health centers for treatment and rehabilitation
12. Inclusive and transparent government

3.0 GENDER SENSITIVE MEDIA

1. Work with women leagues and candidates to promote their visibility
through:
1.1 Provision of media space in electronic and print media;
1.2 Organizing media listening groups
1.3 Include gender sensitive training skills in the media training curricula
2. Support dissemination of gender sensitive messages and materials through:
2.1 Create awareness and appreciation among voters on the importance
and benefits of women candidates;

3. Give media space to women candidates during election campaigns to gain
visibility among voters;
4. Institute a monitoring mechanism to ensure that all candidates and political
parties have equal access to media;
5. Media should be neutral not biased towards any party or any candidate.

4.0 PREVENTION OF ELECTION VIOLENCE

1. Political party leaders should commit to any code of conduct that is
developed to prevent election related violence
2. Political Parties Affairs Council (PPAC) should be in position to withdraw
registration of any party that involves in election violence
3. Political parties should include discussion on prevention of campaign and
election related violence in their South – South dialogues
4. All political parties should issue statements on how they are to conduct
transparent campaigns
5. Media should refrain from fueling violence through:
5.1 not disseminating hate speech and inflammatory remarks
5.2 not engage in sensational reporting of contentious issues
6. All political party leaders should encourage party members not to engage in
violent activities
7. Women candidates should be united and present themselves to have
peaceful elections and should come out with a statement on violence-free
elections
8. Women should commit themselves to respecting and abiding by election
guidelines and the electoral law
9. Women commit themselves to influencing their respective parties to commit
themselves to a violence-free election
10. Media should sensitize the public on free and fair elections and how to
prevent and report election violence
11. Media should be also play a monitoring role to bring to attention of
concerned authorities about potential for violence and malpractices
12. NEC should raise awareness of the public to prevent corruption, illegal
practices and election offences
13. NEC should create awareness among all political party leaders on their
obligations under the electoral law and the penalty for non adherence
14. NEC should conduct its affairs in an impartial, transparent and neutral
manner
15. Government must take the responsibility of providing security during
elections, especially for women candidates, and a special police unit should
be trained to deal with election violence.

5.0 GENDER-SENSITIVE ELECTIONS GUIDELINES

1. NEC should provide an easy mechanism for identifying voters in rural areas
for registration by involving Chiefs or the village chairpersons.
2. Voter registration centers should be within easy reach and easily
identifiable areas.
3. NEC should make it clear that although women have 25% seats, they are also
eligible to be nominated for other positions such as President, Governor,
party list, and the constituency seats.
4. NEC should set-up a gender responsive voter education and disseminate
information concerning elections.
5. NEC should issue strong guidelines against violence in all election processes
6. NEC should invite foreign and local observers during the registration,
campaign, voting and counting of votes and announcing of results processes
7. In case government funding, NEC should ensure equal financial support for
both male and female at all the levels.
8. PPAC should reject any party list or constituency candidate lists which do not
include women
9. NEC should commit to provide financial support for women candidates
competing for constituency seats

6.0 CAPACITY BUILDING FOR FEMALE CANDIDATES

Capacity building for women candidates is imperative to their participation and
success. The following areas have been identified as critical action areas for
women, donors, government and civil society organizations:
1. Training areas:
1.1 Elections Act provisions and electoral procedures
1.2 confidence building
1.3 public speaking
1.4 communication skills and public relations
1.5 Local administration structure and native administration.
1.6 proposal writing
1.7 fund raising for women candidates
1.8 campaign and message development skills
1.9 political skills
1.10 networking skills
2. Institute a fund to train women candidates
3. Women should work at increasing their visibility within their political parties
and among voters
4. Women should sensitize other women and encourage women at the lower
levels to join political parties
5. Women should develop networking skills so as to appreciate the benefits of
networking with women groups and civil society organizations within the
community
6. Formation of a “Women in Political Parties forum” as a learning platform for
political, voter and civic education.
7. Develop a relationship with the media by understanding how it works and
being pro-active by taking advantage of media houses
8. Establish networks and regular dialogue with association of media women in
Sudan
9. Learn the workings and take advantage of media outlets and utilize
alternative media such as email; SMS, radio listening groups for women, etc
10. Develop a communication strategy to address election related issues using
the media

Southern Sudan’s right to a self-determination referendum, scheduled for 2011 after the country’s six-year interim period, is the “bedrock principle” which allowed for the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the 21-year civil war between the government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLA/M).

According to Reeve’s report, “an abundance of evidence now suggests that the ruling National Islamic Front/National Congress Party (NIF/NCP) is intent on undermining or completely forestalling this critical electoral process.” The results will play a crucial role in future legislation that will determine whether or not the south will be able to hold a referendum, how the referendum decision will be measured (by what question) and what the requirements for a self-determination decision will be. This legislation or “Southern Self-Determination Act” was mandated within the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and was supposed to be enacted in 2007. Successive delays in legislating the Act may lead the Khartoum government to postpone the referendum to a later date (as we have seen with the national elections whose date was pushed back twice before settling on April 2010), which according to Reeves, may “trigger full-scale war.”

Some tactics to render independence extremely difficult to attain in a referendum is the NIF/NCP’s insistence that only a minimum 75%  vote requirement is acceptable for secession. Although support for self-determination in the South is over 90%, according to the National Democratic Institute.

According to The Nation article referred to by Reeves, the NIF/NCP also now wants the Referendum Commission’s office to be in Khartoum rather than what the CPA stipulates it to be in Juba. The CPA specifies that the Commission is to have nine members (three from the Government of National Unity, headed by NIF/NCP and six from the Government of Southern Sudan, headed by the SPLM). Khartoum now wants fifteen members with ten from the Government of National Unity. Although the CPA lays out that security forces responsible for monitoring the referendum vote is to be the SPLA and Joint Integrated Forces, the NIF/NCP now wants the Sudan Armed Forces brought to the south for that purpose.

The foundations of a school being built in Mayen Ulem, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Southern Sudan (March 2009)

The two sides don’t agree on the contents of the ballots. Khartoum’s governing NIF/NCP party wants two issues listed on the ballot with voters choosing between unity and secession. The south’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement prefers a single-issue ballot with one question and the option of choosing ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Considering the average 24% literacy rate in the South (37% for men and 12% for women. details) it would seem important to simplify the ballot as much as possible to accurately reflect the choice of the population in the referendum decision.

In Québec, we have had two of our own self-determination referendums  (1980 and 1995) which included a debate as to the question on the ballot from which a decision would be made. The 1980 ballot proposed to negotiate ’sovereignty-association’ while the 1995 ballot proposed ’sovereignty’. The questions asked on each of the two ballots were:

1980: “The Government of Quebec has made public its proposal to negotiate a new agreement with the rest of Canada, based on the equality of nations; this agreement would enable Quebec to acquire the exclusive power to make its laws, levy its taxes and establish relations abroad — in other words, sovereignty — and at the same time to maintain with Canada an economic association including a common currency; any change in political status resulting from these negotiations will only be implemented with popular approval through another referendum; on these terms, do you give the Government of Quebec the mandate to negotiate the proposed agreement between Quebec and Canada?”

1995: “Do you agree that Québec should become sovereign after having made a formal offer to Canada for a new economic and political partnership within the scope of the bill respecting the future of Québec and of the agreement signed on June 12, 1995?”

If complex questions like these are proposed to the people of Southern Sudan in their own self-determination referendum, most of the population would be unable to understand the question and therefore unable to properly decide on an answer.

Reeve’s article continues with evidence that “sophisticated firearms” from Khartoum are being sent to the south and may be exacerbating conflicts in Jonglei State. They are also providing them to the “maniacal Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), originally from northern Uganda and now operating in northern Democratic republic of Congo and in Western Equatoria, Southern Sudan. He discusses the possibility of an SPLM unilateral declaration of Southern independence and the consequences of such a decision.

Reeves ends his report with a review of the US Special Envoy for Sudan, Scott Gration, describing him as seeming “deeply naïve—or even more deeply disingenuous.” To read the entire report visit his website.