To the surprise of researchers, wildlife remains plentiful in southern Sudan's Boma National Park, despite a long civil war, which ended in 2005. Here, a herd of elephants move through a grassland in the park. (Miguel Juarez for NPR)

[Montréal, Québec, Canada -2°C] Before the last civil war started in Sudan in 1983, the country’s protected areas, according to the Wildlife Conservaton Society, “supported some of the most spectacular and important wildlife populations in Africa, and hosted the second largest wildlife migration in the world.” According to their website, “During an aerial survey, more than 1.3 million white-eared kob, tiang (African antelope), and mongalla gazelle are thriving in Southern Sudan.” And apparently, an estimated 8,000 elephants are located within the Jonglei region and particularly in Boma National Park.

This seems like such good news considering that all other information coming from Sudan is about war crimes in Darfur, tribal conflict, a fragile peace agreement and upcoming elections which may or may not be fair and free.

Sudan’s central and southern governments are over-dependent on oil for their respective revenues. Considering most of the developed oil fields straddle the as-yet-undemarkated border that situates the south, oil will play an important role in the country’s ability to hold on to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and avoid a third civil war.

Within the volatile political context that is Sudan, there has been little to no reporting on the country’s natural environment and the potential for wildlife reserves and national parks to become an important source of revenue for the South. Tanzania’s revenues from safari tourism is their second largest source of foreign currency after agricultural exports. And it is steadily growing.

The south is now seriously underdeveloped and lacking in general infrastructure and its primary foreing trade is done in oil, which is managed by the Central govenrment in Khartoum who shares the revenues with the government of Southern Sudan. The South has other exports like gum Africa to gain some foreign currency for its own development but it needs more revenue streams and with greater dieversity.

Of course it will take a while to develop the infrastructure for safari tourism but the southeastern region of Southern Sudan seems apt to offer an important future source of revenue that can rival oil exports.

Considering that wildlife tourism could be added to the important oil export to earn foreign capital, the region’s national parks and wildlife reserves could provide a genuine revenue stream for Southern Sudan’s economy that would diminish oil dependence.

Sudan Oil / Wildlife Overlay (source: Wildlife Conservation Society and European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2007)

How will an oil economy adapt to an emerging wildlife conservation economy? Just how do the two share the land? I thought it would be interesting to visualize how the two might complement or conflict with one another. Wildlife conservation and resource exploitation do not make good bedfellows and are unable to share the territory.

The map to the left is an overlay of two maps: one of national parks and wildlife reserves taken from the Wildlife Conservation Society and the other is of oil concessions and exploited oil fields taken from the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan.

It would seem that the Zeraf Reserve and the proposed extension are located in Blocks A, 5A and 5B, three very active regions of oil exploration and exploitation, particularly Block 5A.

The Southern National Park seems to be outside any region of exploration. The Boma National Park as well as the proposed Bandingallo National Park are within Block B at the fringes of oil exploration but not at risk of exploitation and future exploitation.

How these two ‘resources’ will coexist has yet to be seen. Hopefully, the Southern Sudanese will recognize the long-term benefits of protecting the land and its wildlife for their own benefit and the benefit of wildlife enthusiasts rather than succumb to foreign lust for oil. If the so-called ‘international community’ is genuinely interested in helping Sudan hold on to its fragile peace and preventing a third civil war in the Sudan, it needs to begin washing the bloody oil of its hands and help build a local industry that brings money into the country rather than take resources out.

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Further reading:

- After Sudan’s Civil War: Where the Wild Things Are. NPR’s WBUR Radio.

- Fragile peace may unravel in Southern Sudan. CNN

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Below is a video from CNN that give us a first-time glimpse of oil well pollution in Southern Sudan.

The arbitration agreement between the Government of Sudan and the southern Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) was received by the Permanent Court of Arbitration on July 11, 2008 with both parties agreeing to a “final and binding” decision by the tribunal.

On July 14, 2004, the Abyei Boundaries Commission published its report that outlined Abyei’s boundaries to an area that was much larger than Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party previously claimed. They subsequently rejected the commission’s report, stating that the Commission exceeded its mandate. The case was then referred to the Tribunal.

Arbitration Award Map (source: Permanent Court of Arbitration, July 22, 2009)

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The Tribunal’s mandate was to determine whether the Abyei Boundaries Commission exceeded its mandate “to define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka cheifdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” The Tribunal determined the excess of mandate by reviewing the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC)’s interpretation and implementation of their mandate. The Tribunal’s press release reads, “The Tribunal therefore finds that the ABC Experts DID NOT EXCEED their mandate in interpreting their mandate…”

The Tribunal concludes however “that the ABC Experts EXCEEDED their mandate in certain areas of its implementation.” The ABC’s mandate was exceeded for the drawing of the northernmost border of the “Ngok Dinka and Misseriya’s ’shared rights’ area at latitude 10°35′N [...] because they did not provide sufficient reasoning.” The Tribunal found that “there was NOT an excess of mandate” regarding the ABC’s drawing of the northern limit of Ngok Dinka’s area of permanent habitation transferred in 1905. However, the eastern and western boundaries chosen by the ABC was determined to be “in excess of mandate for failure to state sufficient reasoning.”

Abyei's former market area (April 2009)

Abyei Arbitration Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration thus delimited a new boundary (see above map) that is somewhat smaller than the one represented in mauve by the Abyei Boundaries Commission.

According to a report by Miraya FM, the head of Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party, Al Dirdiri Mohamed Ahmed, stated that “the [Tribunal's] decision supports NCP’s vision regarding the [border's] demarcation.” Minister of Foreign Affairs and member of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, Deng Alor, “welcomed the Court’s decision and assured the movement’s commitment of the ruling.” Mohamed Ali Alansari, a leader from the Misseriya tribe stated that they are “studying the judgement to determine a final position.”

Central Abyei street scene (April 2009)

Abyei is an important oil-producing region of Sudan, which in 2003 provided approximately 25% of Sudan’s total oil production. Defined within the Abyei Protocol (Chapter IV of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement), Abyei is “the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 1905.” Residents of Abyei are define as “Members of the Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area.” The Arab Misseriya pastoralists are not specifically mentioned as residents of the area and their grazing rights in this pasture-rich region—as prescribed in the Abyei Protocol—are a source of conflict.

Central Abyei street scene (April 2009)

The Protocol outlines the sharing of oil revenues between the northern Government of National Unity and the Government of Southern Sudan. The CPA provides for a self-determination referendum for Southern Sudan in 2011, as well as a separate ballot referendum within Abyei “to retain its special administrative status in the north” or “to be part of Bahr el Ghazal” located in the south. Abyei’s decision will be irrespective of the South’s decision in the 2011 self-determination referendum.

Central Abyei street scene (April 2009)

On May 14, 2008, a battle erupted between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army, forcing tens of thousands of residents to flee south to the Agok area where most of the displaced people remain in precarious conditions. Much of the town Abyei was destroyed by the conflict. One year later, as these recent photos portray, the town has yet to recover. As a result of the bloody fighting that left up to, the two parties decided to resolve the issue with the Permanent Court of Arbitration.

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Further reading:

- Abyei: Emir of the mujahidin in the Misseriya tribe rejects PCA’s ruling (25 July, 2009)

- Declaration on Abyei ruling by South Sudan’s President Salva Kiir Mayardit (23 July, 2009)

- INSTANT VIEW: Court ruling on Sudan’s Abyei region (22 July, 2009)

- Sudan: Backslaps and caveats over Abyei (22 July 2009)

- Sudan: Abyei Briefing (21 July 2009)

- Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock (12 October 2007)

- Sudan: Abyei Boundary Commission report (16 August 2005)

Here is the transcript of the audio report with a few added photos:

Exactly three weeks ago, the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for the President of Sudan, Omar Hassan Al-Bashir, for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed in Darfur. Like many people in Sudan, I was glued to the television set to view the announcement. It was 4 p.m.

An anonymous blogger who worked for an international aid agency in Darfur wrote on AlertNet, that one hour after the announcement was made, his agency received a phone call. “The Government had revoked our licence and we must close all our programmes. No further explanation. First thing the next day we were told all international staff had to leave Darfur by 4 p.m.” They had to be out of the area exactly 24 hours after the ICC announcement.

According the the UN’s Organization for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 13 International Agencies were expelled:
- Action contre la faim
- Solidarité
- Save the Children (UK & US)
- Medecins Sans Frontières (NL & FR)
- CARE International
- Oxfam (GB)
- Mercy Corps
- International Rescue Committee
- Norwegian Refugee Council
- CHF International
- PADCO
- And three Sudanese relief agencies were also closed.

The International Herald Tribune reported on March 21, that armed men looted Oxfam’s Darfur Warehouse, “stealing all of its contents.” While in Malual Kon, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State where Mercy Corps has a compound, I learned that all of their equipment from their Darfur and Khartoum operations were seized since their expulsion: computers, communication radios, everything. Since their communication system was centred in Khartoum, they have had to reorganize their communication strategy for their activities in Southern Sudan.

Internews—which is an International NGO affiliated with Mercy Corps—coordinates Nhomlaau FM in Malual Kon. It has three other community radio stations in Southern Sudan. One of these is located in Kurmuk, Blue Nile State, which is within the North/South transitional area. The radio station there was nearly closed along with Mercy Corps, but they managed to continue broadcasting by arguing their independence of the US-based NGO.

I’ve been travelling throughout Southern Sudan for the past four weeks and was recently in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state, which shares its northern border with Southern Darfur. According to the IRIN News Network, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal is expecting an influx of Internally Displaced People (or IDPs) from Southern Darfur as conditions are expected to deteriorate as a result of the expulsion of the 16 NGOs. Although the report suggests that the UN and the Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission are “are preparing for potential inflows of Darfuris,” their arrival will certainly put a strain on the area’s already scarce infrastructure.

IDPs returning to Northern Bahr el_Ghazal in 2007 (courtesy IOM)

Since 2007, there has been a coordinated transport of hundreds of thousands of IDP returnees to Northern Bahr el-Ghazal from Southern Darfur and Khartoum. These people are returning to their homeland after being displaced during Sudan’s other civil war that ended with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. Many are returning to rural locations without access to sanitation, safe drinking water, clinics or schools.

According to the International Organization for Migration (or IOM), many villages in the area have had a rate of IDP Returnees as high as 80-90% of their pre-2007 population. 2007 is the year when organized returns of Internally displaced people began in earnest with the help of IOM and the government of Southern Sudan.

waterhole in War Faj, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal

Access to safe drinking water is already in short supply throughout the state for those already living there. The influx of Darfuris could cause serious tensions at existing water sources and could lead to localized conflict. Waterborne infectious diseases, like cholera and meningitis, could become a serious problem.

To make matters worse, the rainy season is approaching. By the end of April, road travel will be become difficult and delivery of goods will be seriously impaired. Rain is a serious matter in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and neighbouring states. During the 2008 rainy season the state experienced serious flooding. During my time in the area, I’ve driven past remnants of nearly half a dozen temporary camps where thousands were displaced to during last year’s flooding.

Flood Map of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap States (courtesy UNJLC, Juba)

A March 1, 2009 report from the Famine Early Warning Systems Network, writes, “The potential movement of 1.5 million displaced Darfur residents into Southern Sudan’s Northern and Western Bahr el-Ghazal states, due to disruptions in humanitarian assistance, presents a severe threat to food security in the two states.”

During a visit to Darfur four days after the ICC arrest warrant was issued President Al-Bashir said that his decision to expel the 16 NGOs from Darfur was “irreversible.” The position of the Khartoum government has not changed since, although they have vowed to replace the international NGOs with Sudanese agencies and end the need for aid in Darfur within the year. No clear solution is in sight.

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An interesting article about Fallout Scenarios as a result of the expulsion of 16 NGOs from Darfur can be found here.

In the offices of Sudan Radio Service in Nairobi, Kenya. (February 2009)

While in Nairobi, I made contact with Southern Sudan as it expresses itself in exile, taking refuge from the past while building for the future. One of the first visits was to the offices of the Sudan Radio Service (SRS). This organisation is Southern Sudan’s first independent broadcast provider of news and information about Southern Sudan. It is broadcast on various FM and shortwave signals. Their first broadcast was made on July 30, 2003, 1 1/2 years before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan and the southern-based Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA). SRS broadcasts in English, Arabic and eight Sudanese ethnic languages, and focuses exclusively on Issues and events in Sudan.

I met with John Tanza, the radio station’s Deputy Chief of Party (a title that reflects the primary funder of SRS: USAID). We discussed possible collaborations between me and SRS correspondents based in Southern Sudan. We decided that I should meet with SRS journalists that work from areas I visit to collaborate on stories of common interest.

Dan Eiffe in his Sudan Mirror office in Nairobi, Kenya. (February 2009)

In fact, we have planned that I hook up with Martin Siba, the SRS Wau Bureau Producer. I will be going to Wau after Juba on Wednesday, March 4 for a few days before continuing onward to Aweil, Warrap and Abyei.

Another place I went to visit are the Sudan Mirror. The paper’s publisher and founder, Dan Eiffe (photo) invited me into his office and told me stories of when he was a young Irish priest in South Africa and later in Southern Sudan. He told me that in June 1998 he stood in the US Congress and said to the congressmen and women during his testimony, “Southern Sudan is apartheid at its worst. Apartheid is a tea party in comparison to what happens in Southern Sudan.” Below is an audio interview I did with Dan Eiffe in February 2009.

Outside the modest grounds of Sud Academy in Nairobi, Kenya (February 2009)

Southern Sudanese refugees left Sudan during the civil war in numbers of about one million. This does not include the internally displaced people (IDPs) that rang from 4.5 to 5 million people. Many refugees ended up in Kenya and among these are the students of Sud Academy, a primary / secondary school based in a poor neighbourhood of Nairobi.

Partial funding for Sud Academy comes from Canadian Aid for South Sudan (CASS), through which I learnt of the school and who gave me contact with, Kellee Jacobs a Canadian volunteer who bfought me to the school. She wrote The Right to Education – Sud Academy’s Case Study. I’ve posted more photos from the school here.

Since the beginning of October, I’ve come to Le Cheval Blanc on Wednesday evenings to initiate a ritual meeting place among friends to establish tradition where non existed before. A recurrent gathering—without notice—to linger over a pint of locally brewed beer and discuss our respective projects and catch up on each other’s lives. Come after 17h00 and, barring lateness, I will be there. In my absence, carry on without me.

This ‘tradition’ is important now because I’m feeling somewhat shaky these days, having left much of my former professional self behind to begin anew. Bye bye book publishing. It was nice knowing you. We shared ten great years. But without the meetings, editorial schedules and launch deadlines, I find myself with blank agenda pages and insufficient diversity on any given day. Since I closed the bed & breakfast 77 days ago, the early breakfasts, dirty laundry and evening check-ins cease to guide my days with their punctual familiarity. And now I’ve moved to another part of town. Terra incognita. A potentially dreadful place if one is captivated by fear of the unknown. A place of potential crisis if left untethered. A panic attack circling like a pack of hyenas. A pocketed paper bag in the onslaught of hyperventilation. Luckily for me I thrive on change but it sometimes takes a bit of adjustment.

I don’t fear the horizon ahead of me, of falling of the edge of the world. I enjoy facing the open ocean imagining the current taking me toward the rest of the world. These are moments when everything is possible. It’s the potential of it all that makes new projects worth pursuing. And it’s precisely this potential that leads me to Africa or more precisely to Sudan, a place devastated by post-colonial war. I read in this morning’s newspaper that just yesterday, at the National Forum on Darfur, held in Khartoum, Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir called for a ceasefire in Darfur and the immediate disarmament of the Janjaweed militias 1, 2, 3, 4. Maybe the western region of Sudan will grasp the tenuous peace that continues in South Sudan, where I’m headed at the end of January or early February.

South Sudan may be one of the more remote and underdeveloped regions of the world but it is on the cusp of something new. Something great. Great because it has been at peace with the central Sudanese government since 2005, after two debilitating civil wars (1956-1972 & 1983-2005). Great because four million refugees are returning to their traditional homeland. Great because schools are being built to educate the girls and boys who have now experienced peace for the first time. Great because elections are coming in 2009 and the population is learning about democratic processes by state-sponsored, privately owned, and community media. Great because in 2011, the South can hold a referendum( as mandadted in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the northern Government of Sudan (GoS) and the southern-based Sudan Peoples Liberation Movement) that can give the South independence from the rest of Sudan. I’m not adverse to separation but I’d like to ask the South Sudanese what they want in their context.

Everyone knows that holding elections or referenda after decades of war can be volatile in the best of times, but its potential for holding onto the peace is palpable. I want to be there, as it unfolds, to witness, capture and understand this potential.

South Sudan, as a political entity in and of itself, is without tradition. Its existence is new, since the 2005 peace agreement. I am not referring to the traditions of the various community and ethnic groups, like the Dinka, Nuer, and 68 others listed by The Gurtong Peace Trust. Their respective traditions go back farther than anyone can accurately refer to. Theirs are oral histories that have been passed on through generations since the beginning of time.

The tradition I’m referring to is in the tradition of peace and co-habitation within a geographic area and political setting that did not really exist before the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005, beginning a 6-year interim period and establishing South Sudan as an autonomous region within Sudan.

Now midway in this interim period, Sudan is preparing for elections. The Fifth National Population Census is underway to reveal the demographics of the country but I’m particularly interested in the South. How many people actually make up its population? A difficult questions considering about half of the four million refugees have yet to return to their ancestral lands. Some are internally displaced within Sudan, others are refugees in neighbouring countries, while still others have taken refuge in Canada, the United States, and other western countries. How can so many people who are still on the move be accurately counted? And how accurate must the count be to consider election results fair and democratic? There hasn’t been an accurate census taken in Sudan since 1983 before the beginning of its 2nd civil war.

To give you an idea of the challenges, Southern Sudan’s land mass is huge with an area of about 640,000 square kilometres (about the size of France), with a population estimated somewhere between 7.5 and 9.7 million. According to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFDA), the population is expected to increase by as much as three million in the next six years due to the natural increase in population and the return of refugees and internally displaced people. Where will they all live? What infrastructure is needed to accommodate their arrival? What will they do when they get to where they are going? Humanitarian and development aid is needed in South Sudan to provide for those who are already there, so how much more is needed to accommodate the returnees? These are questions that are rarely discussed in Western media so how else is one supposed to genuinely understand without interviewing the few that follow the case closely and talking to the people living through the tumultuous changes? Although the peace holds a huge potential to rejuvenate a wounded land and its scattered people, its erratic interpretation by those who’ve only known war—and the geopolitical wrangling by those interested in the South’s resources—can foment crisis conditions reminiscent of the recent past.

If I can share challenges and successes of the peace process in written, audio and video reports and documentary films, which few others seem to be doing, then maybe it will be a little easier (if ever so slightly) for peace to settle in and make itself comfortable. That’s another reason I want to go.

Kapuscinski writes in the aforementioned book that experience has taught him that “situations of crisis appear more dire and dangerous from a distance than they do up close.” I tend to agree. He continues in the chapter about Zanzibar, that mythical island off the coast of Kenya, about when he chartered a plane from Dar es Salaam to Zanzibar to report the previous day’s coup d’état there. He adds, “Our imaginations hungrily and greedily absorb every tiny bit of sensational news, the slightest portent of peril, the faintest whiff of gunpowder, and instantly inflate these signs to monstrous, paralyzing proportions.” Corporate media thrive on this sensationalism but I want to get past it; closer to the truth. However, Kapuscinski doesn’t denigrate the havoc that can reign during such times. He wrote “about those moments when calm, deep waters begin to churn and bubble into general chaos [...] it is easy to perish by accident, because someone didn’t hear something fully or didn’t notice something in time. On such days, the accident is king; it becomes history’s true determinant and master.”

I’ve never been prone to accidents and I plan on keeping it that way.